Referrals

Specialization requires that workers deal with some valuable opportunities themselves and refer other, possibly unverifiable, opportunities to other workers. How do markets and organizations ensure the matching of opportunities with talent in the presence of informational asymmetries about their value? The cost of providing incentives for effort in this context is that they increase the risk of the agent appropriating an opportunity she should refer upstream. Thus spot markets are severely limited in their ability to support referrals, as they involve very powerful effort incentives on those opportunities kept by the referring agents. We show that partnerships, in which agents agree to share opportunities and the income from the opportunities, appear endogenously as a solution to this problem. Partnership contracts support better communication rules at the expense of biasing effort provision away from first best for all activities. The structure of the contract depends both on the frequency of communications and on the interaction between the relative skill of the agents and the direction of the referral flow.

The Demand for Coordination

This paper endogenizes coordination problems in organizations by allowing for both ex ante coordination of activities, using rules and task guidelines, and ex post coordination, using communication and broad job assignments. It shows that: (i) Task specialization and the division of labor is mainly limited by employee discretion, rather than by the importance of coordination. In particular, specialization is often non-monotonic in the importance of coordination. (ii) Organizations exhibit increasing returns to ex post coordination. This rationalizes discrete `shifts' in organizational design from very rigid and specialized task assignments, to very flexible organizations characterized by extensive task bundling, intensive horizontal communication and substantial employee discretion. (iii) Broad task assignments and intensive horizontal communication are complementary. Hence, lower communication costs often result in less specialization.

Cash-Flow Risk, Discount Risk, and the Value Premium

A habit persistence, general equilibrium model with multiple assets matches both the time series properties of the market portfolio and the cross-sectional predictability of returns on price sorted portfolios, the value premium. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model shows that (a) value stocks are those with higher cash-flow risk; (b) the size of the value premium is larger in %u201Cbad times,%u201D due to time variation in risk preferences; (c) the unconditional CAPM fails, because of general equilibrium restrictions on the market portfolio. The dynamic nature of the value premium rationalizes why the conditional CAPM and a Fama and French (1993) HML factor outperform the unconditional CAPM.

Conditional Betas

Empirical evidence shows that conditional market betas vary substantially over time. Yet, little is known about the source of this variation, either theoretically or empirically. Within a general equilibrium model with multiple assets and a time varying aggregate equity premium, we show that conditional betas depend on (a) the level of the aggregate premium itself; (b) the level of the firm's expected dividend growth; and (c) the firm's fundamental risk, that is, the one pertaining to the covariation of the firm's cash-flows with the aggregate economy. Especially when fundamental risk (c) is strong, the model predicts that market betas should display a large time variation, that their cross-sectional dispersion should be negatively related to the aggregate premium, and that investments in physical capital should be positively related to changes in betas. These predictions find considerable support in the data.

Labor Income and Predictable Stock Returns

We propose and test a novel economic mechanism that generates stock return predictability on both the time series and the cross section. In our model, investors' income has two sources, wages and dividends, that grow stochastically over time. As a consequence, the fraction of total income produced by wages changes over time de-pending on economic conditions. We show that as this fraction fluctuates, the risk premium that investors require to hold stocks varies as well. We test the main implications of the model and find substantial support for it. A regression of stock returns on lagged values of the labor income to consumption ratio produces statistically significant coefficients and adjusted R2 's that are larger than those generated when using the dividend price ratio. Tests of the cross sectional implication find considerable improvements on the performance of both the conditional CAPM and CCAPM when compared to their unconditional counterparts.

Prospect Theory and Asset Prices

We propose a new framework for pricing assets, derived in part from the traditional consumption-based approach, but which also incorporates two long-standing ideas in psychology: prospect theory, and evidence on how prior outcomes affect risky choice. Consistent with prospect theory, the investor in our model derives utility not only from consumption levels but also from changes in the value of his financial wealth. He is much more sensitive to reductions in wealth than to increases, the ``loss-aversion'' feature of prospect utility. Moreover consistent with experimental evidence, the utility he receives from gains and losses in wealth depends on his prior investment outcomes; prior gains cushion subsequent losses -- the so-called 'house-money' effect -- while prior losses intensify the pain of subsequent shortfalls. We study asset prices in the presence of agents with preferences of this type, and find that our model reproduces the high mean, volatility, and predictability of stock returns. The key to our results is that the agent's risk-aversion changes over time as a function of his investment performance. This makes prices much more volatile than underlying dividends and together with the investor's loss-aversion, leads to large equity premia. Our results obtain with reasonable values for all parameters.

Prospect Theory and Asset Prices

We study asset prices in an economy where investors derive direct utility not only from consumption but also from fluctuations in the value of their financial wealth. They are loss averse over these fluctuations and the degree of loss aversion depends on their prior investment performance. We find that our framework can help explain the high mean, excess volatility and predictability of stock returns, as well as their low correlation with consumption growth. The design of our model is influenced by prospect theory and by experimental evidence on how prior outcomes affect risky choice.

Rational Inattention and Organizational Focus

This paper studies optimal communication flows in organizations. A production process can be coordinated ex ante, by letting agents stick to a prespecified plan of action. Alternatively, agents may adapt to task-specific shocks, in which case tasks must be coordinated ex post, using communication. When attention is scarce, an optimal organization coordinates only a few tasks ex post. Those tasks are higher performing, more adaptive to the environment, and influential. Hence, scarce attention requires setting priorities, not just local optimization. Our results provide microfoundations for a central idea in the management literature that firms should focus on a limited set of core competencies

El Diluvio: The Spanish Banking Crisis, 2008-2012

CitationSantos, Tano. El Diluvio: The Spanish Banking Crisis, 2008– 2012. Columbia Business School and NBER, July 13, 2017

Political credit cycles: the case of the Euro zone

We study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro